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HEREDITARILY STRUCTURALLY COMPLETE
SUPERINTUITIONISTIC DEDUCTIVE SYSTEMS
ALEX CITKIN
Abstract. The paper studies hereditarily complete superintuitionistic
deductive systems, that is, the deductive system which logic is an ex-
tension of the intuitionistic propositional logic. It is proven that for
deductive systems a criterion of hereditary structurality - similar to one
that exists for logics - does not exists. Nevertheless, it is proven that
many standard superintuitionistic logics (including Int) can be defined
by a hereditarily structurally complete deductive system.
1. Introduction
The notion of structural completeness was introduced by W. Pogorzelski
in [20]: a (propositional) deductive system1 S is structurally complete if every
admissible in S rule is derivable in S (and we denote this by S ∈ SC).
First, let us clarify the above definition. Let For be a set of all (propo-
sitional) formulas built in a usual way from an infinite countable set P of
(propositional) variables and from a finite set C of connectives. A (struc-
tural) rule is an ordered pair Γ/B, where Γ is a finite (maybe empty) set
of formulas, and B is a formula. Deductive system is understood as a pair
⟨Ax ,R⟩, where Ax is a set of formulas and R is a set of rules. And each de-
ductive system S defines in a natural way a consequence relation denoted by
⊢S and a logic {A ∈ For ∶ ⊢S A} denoted by L(S). Given a deductive system
S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩, a rule r ∶= Γ/B is admissible in S if L(S) = L(⟨Ax ,R + r⟩), and
r is derivable in S if Γ ⊢S B, that is, if ⊢⟨Ax ,R⟩ = ⊢⟨Ax ,R+r⟩. In other words,
a rule r is admissible in a deductive system S if extending R by r does not
change the logic of S, while r is derivable in S if extending R by r does not
change derivability in S.
For instance, let us consider classical deductive system (calculus) Sc ∶=
⟨Ax c,mp⟩, where Ax c is a set of classical axiom schemes and mp ∶= A,A →
B/B is Modus Ponens (see e.g. [18][Section 1.4]); and let us consider intu-
itionistic deductive system Sc ∶= ⟨Ax i,mp⟩, where Ax i is a set of intuition-
istic axiom schemes (see e.g. [18][Section 1.6]). A consequence relation ⊢Sc
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1Pogorzelski is using the term ”calculus”, but we prefer the term ”deductive system”,
saving the term ”calculus” for the deductive systems with finite sets of axiom schemes
and rules. In [19] a term ”formal system” has been used.
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is structurally complete, while consequence relation ⊢Si is not structurally
complete, for the rule ¬p→ (q ∨ r)/(¬p → q) ∨ (¬p → r) is admissible in ⊢Si
but not derivable in it.
Soon after the notion of structural completeness had been introduced,
Dzik and Wronski observed [10] that not only the deductive system Sl ∶=
⟨Ax i + ((p → q) ∨ (q → p)),mp⟩ is structurally complete, but all its exten-
sions are structurally complete too; that is, Sl is hereditarily structurally
complete (and we denote this by Sl ∈ HSCpl). In [9] Citkin had obtained
a criterion of hereditary structural completeness for the deductive systems
⟨Ax ,mp⟩, where Ax i ⊆ Ax . Later, in [23] Rybakov had proven a similar crite-
rion for normal extensions of modal logic K4. More recently, Olson, Raftery
and van Alten (see [19] ) had established hereditarily structural complete-
ness for a range of substructural logics. For fuzzy logics and their fragments
the hereditary structural completeness was studied by Cintula and Met-
calfe [6]. In [27] S lomczyn´ska proved that {↔,¬¬}-fragment of intuitionistic
propositional calculus is hereditarily structural complete.
Let us note that admissibility of a rule in a deductive system depends
exclusively on the logic of the system: a rule Γ/B is admissible in a deductive
system S if and only if for every (uniform) substitution σ (of formulas for
variables) we have σ(B) ∈ L(S) as long as σ(A) ∈ L(S) for every A ∈ Γ.
Hence, if r is admissible in ⟨Ax ,R⟩, it is admissible in ⟨Ax ,R + r⟩ too, and
L(⟨Ax ,R⟩) = L(⟨Ax ,R + r⟩). Thus, for every deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩
there is a structurally complete deductive system S̃ having the same logic as
S and in which all admissible in S rules are derivable: we can take S̃ = ⟨Ax , R̃⟩,
where R̃ is the set of all rules admissible in S. Naturally, S̃ is structurally
complete, and we say that S̃ is a structural completion2 of S. Clearly, a
deductive system S is structurally complete if and only if S = S̃. Moreover,
given a logic L, we can consider a deductive system L̃ ∶= ⟨L, R̃⟩, where R̃ is the
set of all rules admissible in L, and we say that L̃ is a structural completion
of logic L.
As we know, the structural completion of a logic is, of course, structurally
complete. On the other hand, every hereditarily structural complete deduc-
tive system S is a structural completion of its logic L(S). Thus, if we want
study the hereditarily structural complete deductive systems, it is natural to
ask structural completions of which logics are hereditarily structural com-
plete. In this paper we focus primarily on superintuitionistic logics, that is
on logics extending intuitionistic propositional logic Int .
First (in Section 2) we consider some general properties of hereditar-
ily structurally complete deductive systems. Then, in Section 3, we recall
definitions and properties of admissible and derivable rules. Section 4 is
dedicated to studying hereditarily structurally complete deductive systems,
and here we prove the main theorem (Theorem 4.9) that establishes a link
between hereditary structural completeness and inheritance of the bases of
2In [24] the term ”admissible closure” is used.
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admissible rules. And then (in Section 5) we consider some well known
superintuitionistic logics from the standpoint of hereditary structural com-
pleteness of their structural completions. Some results are summarized in
the Table 1 (where L ∈ HSCpl means ⟨L,mp⟩ ∈ HSCpl).
L Description L ∈ HSCpl L̃ ∈ HSCpl Definition
Int (intuitionistic logic) No Yes
LC (Go¨del - Dummett logic) Yes Yes [5, Table 4.1]
BDn Logic of finite of depth n No (n > 1) No (n > 3) [5, Table 4.1]
Gn (Go¨del logics) Yes Yes LC ∩BDn
KC (Yankov logic) No Yes [5, Table 4.1]
KP (Kreisel-Putnam logic) No No [5, Table 4.1]
ML (Medvedev logic) No No [5, Section 2.9]
V (logic of Visser’s rules) Yes Yes [15]
RN (logic of Rieger-Nishimura ladder) No Yes [2]
Sm (Smetanich logic) Yes Yes [5, Table 4.1]
Table 1. Intermediate Logics and Their Structural Completions.
2. Deductive Systems and Consequence Relations
2.1. Deductive Systems. In this section we recall the basic properties of
(propositional) deductive systems and their links to consequence relations.
Language. A propositional language L is understood as a finite set of
connectives with specified finite arities. The notion of L-formula over a
fixed countably infinite set of propositional variables P is defined in the
usual manner. For denotes the set of all L-formulas. A mapping σ ∶ P → For
is called a substitution. If σ is a substitution and A is a formula, by σ(A) we
denote a result of simultaneous replacement of each occurring of variable p in
A with σ(p). If Γ is a set of formulas, by σ(Γ) we denote a set {σ(A) ∶ A ∈ Γ}.
We say that a formula B is a substitution instance of a formula A if there
is a substitution σ such that B = σ(A).
Inference Rules. An ordered couple ⟨Γ,A⟩, where Γ ⊆ For is a finite
(maybe empty) set of formulas and A ∈ For is a formula, is called a (structural
inference) rule. We use a more custom notation: Γ/A. Formulas Γ are called
premises, while formula A is called a conclusion. The set of all rules we
denote by Rls.
If r ∶= Γ/A is a rule and σ is a substitution, then σ(Γ)/σ(A) is said to be
a σ-substitution instance of rule r (denoted by σ(r)) and we omit reference
to a particular substitution when no confusion arises.
Deductive System. An ordered couple ⟨Ax ,R⟩, where Ax ⊆ For and
R ⊆ Rls are non-empty sets respectively of formulas and of rules, is called
a deductive system. Let S = ⟨Ax ,R⟩ be a deductive system. Then Ax is a
set of axioms of S and R is a set of rules of S. And, given a finite set of
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formulas Γ and a formula A, a sequence of formulas B1, . . . ,Bn is called an
S-inference of A from Γ if the following holds
(i1) Bn = A;
(i2) for all i = 1, . . . , n either Bi ∈ Γ, or Bi is a substitution instance of
an axiom from Ax , or there is a substitution instance ∆/Bi of a rule
from R such that ∆ ⊆ {B1, . . . ,Bi−1}.
If there is an S-inference of A from Γ, we say that A is an S-consequence of
Γ and we denote this by Γ ⊢S A. If Γ = ∅, we write ⊢S A and say that A is
S-derivable or that A is an S-theorem. The set of all S-theorems is called a
logic of deductive system S, and we denote this set by L(S).
Example 2.1. As examples, we will often use the following two deductive
systems: IPC ∶= ⟨Ax i,mp⟩ and CPC ∶= ⟨Ax c,mp⟩, where Ax i and Ax c are sets
of axiom schemes of intuitionistic and classical propositional calculi from
[18, Section 1], and mp is Modus Ponens.
2.2. Consequence Relations. A (finitary structural) consequence relation
is a relation ⊢ between finite sets of formulas and formulas satisfying the
following conditions: for any finite sets of formulas Γ,Γ′ and each formula
A ∈ For
(a) A ⊢ A
(b) if Γ ⊢ A then Γ ∪ Γ′ ⊢ A
(c) if Γ ⊢ B for every B ∈ Γ′ and Γ′ ⊢ A, then Γ ⊢ A
(d) if Γ ⊢ A the σ(Γ) ⊢ σ(A) for every substitution σ.
Let us note that relation ⊢S for a given deductive system S satisfies the
above definition and, hence, ⊢S is a consequence relation defined by S. On
the other hand, given a consequence relation ⊢, one can take a deductive
system S ∶= ⟨{A ∈ For ∶ ⊢ A},{Γ/B ∈ Rls ∶ Γ ⊢ B}⟩ and verify that ⊢S = ⊢, that
is, every consequence relation can be defined by a deductive system.
Given two consequence relations ⊢ and ⊢′ we say that ⊢′ extends ⊢, or
that ⊢′ is an extension of ⊢, in written ⊢ ≤ ⊢′, if ⊢ ⊆ ⊢′. We say that ⊢′
strongly extends ⊢, or that ⊢′ is a proper extension of ⊢, in written ⊢ < ⊢′,
if ⊢ ⊊ ⊢′. It is clear that the set of all extensions of a given consequence
relation is closed under arbitrary meets, and, therefore, it forms a complete
lattice. An extension ⊢′ of a consequence relation ⊢ is said to be axiomatic
if there is a set of formulas Γ such that ⊢′ is the smallest extension of ⊢
having every formula from Γ as a theorem. In terms of deductive systems,
⊢′ is an axiomatic extension of ⊢S, where S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩, if ⊢′ can be defined
by a deductive system ⟨Ax + Γ,R⟩ for some Γ ⊆ For (comp. [19]).
Example 2.2. Then ⊢CPC is an axiomatic extension of ⊢IPC, because ⊢CPC
can be defined by ⟨Ax i + (¬¬p→ p),mp⟩.
Let S1 and S2 be deductive systems. We say that S2 is logical extension
of S1 (in symbols S1 ≲ S2) if L(S1) ⊆ L(S2); and we say that S2 is a deductive
extension of S1 (and we denote this by S1 ⪅ S2) if ⊢S1 ⊆ ⊢S2 . We also say
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that S1 and S2 are logically equal (in symbols S1 ∼ S2) if L(S1) = L(S2), and
S1 and S2 are deductively equal and we write S1 ≈ S2, if ⊢S1 = ⊢S2 .
Example 2.3. For instance, IPC ⪅ CPC. Moreover, CPC is an axiomatic
extension of IPC: one can take Γ = {(¬¬p→ p)}.
Let us note the following, rather simple property that we will need in the
sequel.
Proposition 2.4. Let S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩ be a deductive system. Then
⟨Ax ,R⟩ ≈ ⟨L(S),R⟩. (1)
This proposition simply means that extending the set of axioms by for-
mulas derived in S does not change the consequence relation defined by S.
Proof. The proof immediately follows from the definition of inference. In-
deed, let A1, . . . ,Ak, . . . ,An be an inference of An from a set of formulas Γ
and Ak ∈ L(S). Then there is an inference B1, . . . ,Bm,Ak of Ak from the
empty set of formulas. Immediately from the definition of inference we can
see that A1, . . . ,B1, . . . ,Bm,Ak, . . . ,An is an inference of An from Γ. Thus,
any inference in ⟨L(S),R⟩ can be converted into an inference in S. 
3. Admissible and Derivable Rules
The goal of this section is to recall the notions of admissibility and deriv-
ability of rules in deductive systems.
3.1. Admissible Rules. We start by recalling the notion of a rule admis-
sible in a given deductive system.
Definition 3.1. Let S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩ be a deductive system. A rule r is called
admissible in S, or in the corresponding consequence relation ⊢S, if logic L(S)
is closed under r, that is, L(⟨Ax ,R⟩) = L(⟨Ax ,R + r⟩) (or ⟨Ax ,R⟩ ∼ ⟨Ax ,R + r⟩).
If S = ⟨Ax ,R⟩ is a deductive system, by R̃(S) we denote the set of all
rules admissible in S. Since adding an admissible rule to a deductive system
does not change the logic of this system and all rules from R are trivially
admissible in S (that is, R ⊆ R̃(S)), we have
S ∼ ⟨Ax , R̃⟩. (2)
Example 3.2. Rule r ∶= ¬(p → (q ∨ r))/((¬p → q) ∨ (¬p → r)) - a Harrop
rule - is admissible in IPC because, as it follows from [13], L(⟨Ax i,mp⟩) =
L(⟨Ax i,mp + r⟩).
The following Proposition gives a well known alternative intrinsic charac-
terization of admissibility.
Proposition 3.3. A rule r ∶= Γ/A is admissible in a deductive system S if
and only if for every σ-substitution instance of r
σ(Γ) ⊆ L(S) yields σ(A) ∈ L. (ADM)
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Proof. Let S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩, S′ ∶= ⟨Ax ,R + r⟩. Then, obviously, L(S) ⊆ L(S′) and
we need to show that (ADM) is equivalent to L(S′) ⊆ L(S). Assume that
(ADM) holds. By simple induction on length of inference one can demon-
strate that any S′-inference from ∅ is, by the same token, an S-inference
from ∅. Thus, L(S′) ⊆ L(S).
Now, assume that (ADM) does not hold and suppose Γ = {A1, . . . ,An}.
Then for some substitution σ, σ(Γ) ∈ L(S) and σ(A) ∉ L(S). Due to σ(Ai) ∈
L(S) for every i = 1, . . . , n, by the definition of L(S), for each formula σ(Ai)
there is an S-inference Ii of Ai from ∅. Clearly, every Ii, i = 1, . . . , n is at
the same time an S′-inference of σ(A) from ∅. Hence, I1, . . . , Ib, σ(A) is
an S′-inference of σ(A) from ∅, which means that σ(A) ∈ L(S′). Thus,
σ(a) ∈ L(S′) and σ(A) ∉ L(S), i.e. L(S) ⊂ L(S′).
The case Γ = ∅ is trivial. 
Thus, admissibility of rules depends only on logic, that is, the following
holds.
Proposition 3.4. Let S0 and S1 be logically equal deductive system. Then
a rule r is admissible in S0 if and only if r is admissible in S1, that is,
R̃(S0) = R̃(S1), (3)
where R̃(Si) denotes the set of all rules admissible in Si, i = 0,1.
Since deductive equality yields logical equality, due to the above Proposi-
tion, we can speak about admissibility of a rule for a consequence relation,
because, if a rule r is admissible in S, then r is admissible in every deductively
equal to S system, that is, in every deductive system defining ⊢S.
Proposition 3.5. Let ⊢ be a consequence relation and r be a rule. Then
the following is equivalent
(a) r is admissible for ⊢ ;
(b) r is admissible in some deductive system defining ⊢;
(c) r is admissible in every deductive system defining ⊢.
If S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩ is a deductive system, by R̃(S) we denote the set of all
rules admissible in S, and by ∣∼S we denote the consequence relation defined
by deductive system ⟨Ax , R̃(S)⟩. Let us observe that ∣∼S is the greatest
consequence relation having L(S) as its set of theorems.
3.2. Derivable Rules. Let S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩ be a deductive system.
Definition 3.6. If r ∶= Γ/A is a rule and Γ ⊢S A, we say that r is derivable
in S, or that r is S-derivable. R(S) denotes a set of all S-derivable rules.
Example 3.7. Every admissible in CPC rule is derivable in CPC, while
Harrop rule is admissible and not derivable in IPC.
It is clear that every derivable in S rule is admissible in S, that is, R(S) ⊆
R̃(S), but not necessarily vice versa, as we see from the above example.
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Proposition 3.8. Let S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩ be a deductive system. Then
⟨Ax ,R⟩ ≈ ⟨Ax ,R(S)⟩. (4)
This proposition simply means that extending the set of rules by the
derivable in S rules does not change the consequence relation defined by S.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2.4. 
The definition of derivability can be rephrased in terms of consequence
relations: given a consequence relation ⊢, a rule Γ/A is ⊢-derivable if Γ ⊢ A.
Let us note that the following holds.
Proposition 3.9. Let ⊢ be a consequence relation and r be a rule. Then
the following is equivalent
(a) r is ⊢-derivable;
(b) r is derivable in some deductive system defining ⊢;
(c) r is derivable in every deductive system defining ⊢.
The proof is easy and it is left for the reader.
Thus, if r is a rule and S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩ is a deductive system, r is admissible
in S if and only if ⟨Ax ,R + r⟩ ∼ ⟨Ax ,R⟩, and r is derivable in S if and only if
⟨Ax ,R + r⟩ ≈ ⟨Ax ,R⟩.
3.3. Base of Admissible Rules. One of the common ways of defining the
set of all rules admissible in a given deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩ is to
present a base, that is, a set of admissible rules from which every admissible
in S rule can be derived.
Definition 3.10. Suppose S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩ is a deductive system. A set of rules
R′ is a relative to S base of admissible rules if ⟨Ax ,R +R′⟩ ≈ ⟨Ax , R̃(S)⟩. And
R′ is a base of admissible in S rules if ⟨L(S),R′⟩ ≈ ⟨L(S), R̃(S)⟩.
The following simple proposition shows the relations between relative
bases and bases.
Proposition 3.11. Let S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩ be a deductive system and R′ be a rela-
tive to S base of admissible rules. Then R+R′ forms a base of admissible in
S rules.
Proof. Indeed, by (1), ⟨Ax ,R +R′⟩ ≈ ⟨L(S),R + R′⟩. On the other hand, by
assumption and by (1), keeping in mind that deductive equality yields logical
equality, we have ⟨Ax ,R + R′⟩ ≈ ⟨Ax , R̃(S)⟩ ≈ ⟨L(S), R̃(S)⟩. 
Example 3.12. As it had been observed in [14], the rules Vn, n = 1,2, . . .
form relative to IPC base for admissible (in IPC) rules:
Vn ∶= r ∨
n
⋀
i=1
(pi → qi)→ (pn+1 ∨ pn+2)/r ∨
n+2
⋁
j=1
(
n
⋀
i=1
(pi → qi)→ pj). (5)
Rules Vn are knows as the Visser’s rules. The set of the Visser’s rules
together with Modus Ponens forms also a base of admissible in IPC rules.
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Naturally, any two logically (and, therefore, any two deductively) equal
systems share the base of admissible rules. In other words, the base of
admissible rules depends only on logic and does not depend on a particular
deductive system defining this logic.
Proposition 3.13. Let S0,S1 be logically equal deductive systems. Then a
set of rules R is a base of admissible in S0 rules if and only if R is a base of
admissible in S1 rules
The proof is trivial: by assumption, S0 ∼ S1 , that is, L(S0) = L(S1).
4. Structural Completeness
In this section we recall the notions of structural and hereditary structural
completeness, and we prove the main theorem (Theorem 4.9) that establishes
a link between hereditary structural completeness and inheritance of a base
of admissible rules.
4.1. Structural Completeness: Definition. The notion of structural
completeness was introduced in [20] and is central for our research.
Definition 4.1. [20] A deductive system S is said to be structurally complete
if R(S) = R̃(S), i.e. if every admissible in S rule is derivable in S.
Example 4.2. CPC is structurally complete, while IPC is not.
Immediately from Propositions 3.5 and 3.9 we obtain the following.
Proposition 4.3. Let ⊢ be a consequence relation. Then the following is
equivalent
(a) ⊢ is structurally complete;
(b) Some deductive system defining ⊢ is structurally complete;
(c) Every deductive system defining ⊢ is structurally complete.
The next Proposition gives an alternative intrinsic definition of structural
completeness, and often it is used as a definition (see e.g. [1, 19, 6]).
Proposition 4.4. A consequence relation ⊢ is structurally complete if and
only if every its proper extension ⊢′ contains the new theorems, i.e.
⊢ < ⊢′ entails Th(⊢) ⊂ Th(⊢′). (SC)
Proof. Suppose that ⊢ is a structurally complete consequence relation and
let ⊢′ be a consequence relation and ⊢ < ⊢′. Due to ⊢ is structurally complete,
every admissible, that is every preserving Th(⊢), rule is ⊢-derivable. Hence,
⊢ cannot have the same set of theorems as ⊢. Thus, (4.1) holds.
Conversely, assume that 4.1 holds and R is a set of all derivable in ⊢
rules. Then ⊢ = ⊢S, where S ∶= ⟨Th(⊢),R⟩. If S is not structurally complete,
there would be an admissible in S but not S-derivable rule r. Consider
deductive system Sr ∶= ⟨Th(⊢),R + r⟩. Due to r is admissible in S, we have
Th(S) = Th(Sr). Due to r is not S-derivable, we have ⊢S < ⊢Sr . 
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4.2. Structural Completions. It is worth noting that every deductive
system S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩ can be extended to a logically equal structurally complete
deductive system. Indeed, denote by R̃(S) the set of all rules admissible in
S, and take deductive system S̃ ∶= ⟨Ax , R̃(S)⟩. It is clear that S ∼ S̃.
Definition 4.5. Deductive system S̃ ∶= ⟨Ax , R̃(S)⟩ is called a structural
completion of S.
Let us observe that S̃ is the greatest relative to ⪅ system among deductive
systems logically equal to S. More precisely, the following holds.
Proposition 4.6. (comp. [1, Proposition 1.2]) Let S and S′ be deductive
systems. Then
S ∼ S′ entails S′ ⪅ S̃. (6)
Proof. Let S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩ and S′ ∶= ⟨Ax ′,R′⟩. Then, due to every derivable rule
is admissible and by (1), we have
S′ = ⟨Ax ′,R′⟩ ⪅ ⟨Ax ′, R̃(S′)⟩ ≈ ⟨L(S′), R̃(S′)⟩ ≈ S̃′.
Let us observe, that S ∼ S′ yields L(S) = L(S′), and that, by (3), R̃(S) =
R̃(S′). Thus,
S̃′ ≈ ⟨L(S′), R̃(S′)⟩ ≈ ⟨L(S), R̃(S)⟩ ≈ S̃.

4.3. Hereditary Structural Completeness.
Definition 4.7. A structurally complete deductive system S is hereditarily
structurally complete if every its deductive extension is structurally complete
(comp. [24, Section 5.4]).
Immediately from the definition it follows that any deductive extension of
a hereditarily structurally complete deductive system is hereditarily struc-
turally complete. At the same time, there are structurally complete de-
ductive systems which are not hereditarily structurally complete (see e.g.
[9]).
The following theorem gives some alternative views at hereditary struc-
tural completeness.
theorem 4.8. [19, Theorem 2.6] Let S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩ be a structural complete
deductive system Then the following is equivalent:
(a) S is hereditarily structural complete;
(b) Every axiomatic extension of S is structural complete;
(c) Every deductive extension of S is axiomatic.
Let us note that if a deductive system S is hereditarily structural complete,
then S is structural completion of a deductive system. Thus, it is natural
to ask for a given deductive system S whether its structural completion
S̃ is hereditarily complete. The next theorem gives some necessary and
sufficient conditions of hereditarily structural completeness of the structural
completion of a deductive system.
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theorem 4.9. Let S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩ be a deductive system and Rb be a relative
base of admissible in S rules. Then S̃ is hereditarily structurally complete if
and only if Rb forms a relative basis of admissible rules in every deductive
extension of S in which rules Rb are admissible.
Proof. Suppose S̃ is a hereditarily structurally complete deductive system
and S′ ∶= ⟨Ax ′,R′⟩ is a deductive extension of S admitting all rules from Rb.
Assume for contradiction that Rb is not a relative base of admissible rules
of S. We will demonstrate that in this case, if Sb ∶= ⟨Ax ′,R′ + Rb⟩, then
(a) Sb is a deductive extension of S̃, i.e. S̃ ⪅ Sb;
(b) Sb is not structurally complete.
Thus (a) and (b) entail that S̃ has a non-structurally complete deductive
extension and, therefore, S̃ is not HSCpl contrary to the assumption.
Proof of (a). By assumption, Rb is a relative basis for S, that is,
⟨Ax ,R +Rb⟩ ≈ S̃. (7)
By (1) and (4) we also have
S′ = ⟨Ax ′,R′⟩ ≈ ⟨L(S′),R′⟩ ≈ ⟨L(S′),R(S′)⟩. (8)
Recall that S′ is a deductive extension of S, therefore,
Ax ⊆ L(S′) and R ⊆ R(S′). (9)
At the same time, Sb was obtained from S
′ by adding to S′ new rules, hence,
Sb is a deductive extension of S
′, and, therefore, we can extend (9):
Ax ⊆ L(S′) ⊆ L(Sb) and R ⊆ R(S
′) ⊆ R(Sb). (10)
Moreover, due to Rb ⊆ R(Sb), from (10) we have
Ax ⊆ L(Sb) and R +Rb ⊆ R(Sb). (11)
And from (7), (11) and by (1), (4)
S̃ ≈ ⟨Ax ,R +Rb⟩ ⪅ ⟨L(Sb),R(Sb)⟩ ≈ ⟨Ax
′,R′ + Rb⟩ = Sb, (12)
that is, Sb is a deductive extension of S̃.
Proof of (b). By assumption, rules Rb do not form a relative base for
S′,that is,
Sb = ⟨Ax
′,R′ + Rb⟩ /≈ ⟨Ax
′, R̃(S′)⟩. (13)
Now, we only need to establish that Sb and ⟨Ax ′, R̃(S′)⟩ have the same logic.
Indeed, by the assumption of the theorem, rules Rb are admissible in S
′, so
⟨Ax ′,R′⟩ ∼ ⟨Ax ′,R′ + Rb⟩ (14)
and, therefore, by (14) and (2)
⟨Ax ′, R̃(S′)⟩ ∼ ⟨Ax ′,R′⟩ ∼ ⟨Ax ′,R′ + Rb⟩. (15)
Conversely, suppose that rules Rb form a relative base of admissible rules
in every deductive extension of S admitting rules Rb. We need to show that S̃
is HSCpl , that is, that its every deductive extension is structurally complete.
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Assume that S′ ∶= ⟨Ax ′,R′⟩ is a deductive extension of S̃. Then by (1) and
by (4),
S′ = ⟨Ax ′,R′⟩ ≈ ⟨L(S′),R(S′)⟩. (16)
Let us recall that rules Rb are admissible in S and, therefore, Rb ⊆ R(S̃) and,
by the assumption, S′ is a deductive extension of S̃, so,
Rb ⊆ R(S̃) ⊆ R(S
′). (17)
(17) means, that rules Rb are derivable in S
′, and S′ is structurally complete
due to all rules from a relative base (of admissible in S′ rules) are derivable
in S′. 
Example 4.10. In [22] Rybakov described the class of all axiomatic exten-
sions of IPC admitting all rules from ĨPC. In the Section 5.1 we discuss this
class in more details.
5. Hereditarily Structural Complete Extensions of
superintuitionistic logics
In this section we study hereditary structural completeness of deductive
extensions of IPC. All hereditarily structural complete axiomatic extensions
of IPC (that is, the deductive systems of type ⟨Ax i + Ax ,mp⟩). The set HSC
of hereditarily structural complete axiomatic extensions of IPC (and of K4
for this matter) has rather nice properties:
(a) HSC is countably infinite;
(b) every deductive system from HSC is finitely axiomatizable;
(c) HSC contains the least (relative to ⪅) deductive system.
As we will see, in a general case the situation is more complex, namely,
none of the above properties holds (see Corollary 5.3 below). Failure of (c)
also entails that the criteria similar to ones established in [9] and [23], are
impossible. In this section, we focus on hereditary structural completions of
the standard superintuitionistic logics listed in the Table 1.
5.1. Hereditary Structural Completeness of Int + Visser Rules.
First, we establish that ĨPC is hereditarily structurally complete, and then
we will consider some deductive extensions of ĨPC.
theorem 5.1. Structural completion of IPC is HSCpl.
Proof. It was established in [14, Theorem 3.20] that Visser’s rules Vn, n > 0
are admissible in IPC, and it was observed in [15, Theorem 3.9] that Visser’s
rules form a base of admissible rules in every deductive extension of IPC
which admits them. Hence, we can apply Theorem 4.9 and complete the
proof. 
Recall that Visser’s rules are admissible in KC and Mn (see [15, Theorem
5.1]) and Visser’s rules are derivable in Bd1,Gn,LC, and Sm (see [15, The-
orem 5.3]). And we know that any deductive extension of HSCpl system is
hereditarily structurally complete. Hence, we have the following.
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Corollary 5.2. Structural completions of the following deductive system are
HSCpl: KC,Mn, KC,Bd1,Gn,LC,Sm.
Rybakov observed [22, Theorem 7] that there is continuum many interme-
diate logics admitting all rules admissible in IPC. Hence, there is continuum
many not logically equivalent deductive systems in which all Visser’s rules
are admissible. Thus, the following holds.
Corollary 5.3. There is continuum many not logically equivalent HSCpl
deductive systems (extending ĨNT ). Therefore, there are not finitely ax-
iomatizable HSCpl deductive systems (extending ĨNT ).
In the following section we will prove that there is continuum many struc-
tural completions of of superintuitionistic logics that are not hereditarily
structurally complete.
5.2. Hereditary Structural Completeness: The Algebraic View.
Generally speaking, there are two ways to prove that a deductive system
S is not structurally complete: to present an admissible in S and not S-
derivable rule, or to use semantic means. It is known (see e.g. [19]) that
each (finitely algebraizable in sense of Blok and Pigozzi [3]) deductive sys-
tem corresponds to a quasivariety of algebras which are models for this
system. In this Section we use the second approach to show that there is
continuum many superintuitionistic logics, whose structural completion is
not HSCpl . But first, we need to recall some notions and facts from the
theory of quasivarieties.
Basic facts from theory of quasivarieties. Let us recall some basic
notions about models of superintuitionistic logics. As usual, we use Heyt-
ing algebras3 as models for superintuitionistic logics. A bounded distribu-
tive lattice ⟨A;∧,∨,0,1⟩ with relative pseudocomplementation → is called a
Heyting algebra (see e.g. [4, Section II]), and we abbreviate a→ 0 as ¬a. A
formula A is refuted in a given (Heyting) algebra A, if there is a valuation
ν in A such that ν(A) ≠ 1. Otherwise A is said to be valid in A. A rule
r ∶= A1, . . . ,An/B is refuted in a given algebra A, if there is a valuation ν
in A such that ν(Ai) = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n, but ν(B) ≠ 1. Otherwise r is
said to be valid in A. Given a set of formulas Γ and a formula A (or set of
rules R and a rule r) we say that an algebra A separates A from Γ (or that
A separates r from R), if A refutes A while all formulas from Γ are valid in
A (if A refutes r, while all rules from R are valid in A).
With each superintuitionistic deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩ one can asso-
ciate a quasivariety Q(S) of all algebras in which all axioms and all rules of
S are valid4 . Moreover, given two deductive systems S1,S2,
S1 ⪅ S2 if and only if Q(S1) ⊇ Q(S2).
3Or frames representing them - see e.g. [24], where Heyting algebras are called ”pseudo-
Boolean algebras”.
4All necessary information about quasivarieties the reader can find in [11].
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and, hence,
S1 ≈ S2 if and only if Q(S1) = Q(S2).
And for every quasivariety Q there is a deductive system S such that Q =
Q(S).
Let S be a deductive system, Q(S) be a corresponding quasivariety, and
FQ(S)(ω) be a free algebra of quasivariety Q(S). Then ([1][Proposition 2.3]),
Q(S̃) = Q(FQ(S)(ω)). (18)
If Q is a quasivariety, we say that Q̃ ∶= Q(FQ(ω)) is a structural completion
of quasivariety Q.
A quasivariety Q is primitive [11] if each its subquasivariety is a relative
variety, that is, for each subquasivariety Q′ ⊆ Q there is a variety V of such
that Q′ = Q ∩ V.
There is correspondence between hereditarily structurally complete de-
ductive systems and primitive quasivarieties.
Proposition 5.4. (Comp. e.g. [19, Corollary 7.15]) A deductive system S
is hereditarily structurally complete if and only if Q(S) is primitive.
Thus, if for a deductive system S its structural completion is HSCpl if
and only if Q̃(S) is primitive.
Let Q be a quasivariety and A ∈ Q be a non-trivial finite algebra. A
is said to be Q-irreducible, if A is not (isomorphic to) a subdirect product
of algebras from Q having less elements then A. And A is said to be
weakly Q-projective, if A embeds in every its homomorphic preimage from
Q (comp. [11]). And we say that an algebra A is totally non-projective, if A
is not weakly projective in the quasivariety Q(A) it generates. It is easy to
see that a totally non-projective algebra is not weekly Q-projective in any
quasivariety Q it belongs to.
Example 5.5. Algebra C′7 corresponding to frame C
′
7 depicted at Fig.1
is totally non-projective. Indeed, algebra C′5 is a subalgebra of C
′
7 and,
therefore, C′5 ∈ Q(C
′
7). Also, C
′
10 is a subdirect product of C
′
5 and C
′
7,
so, C′
10
∈ Q(C′
7
). ButC′
7
is a homomorphic image of C′
10
, and C′
7
is not
embeddable in C′
10
. Hence, C′
7
is not weakly Q(C′
7
)-projective, that is, C′
7
is totally non-projective.
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
C′5 C
′
7 C
′
7
Figure 1. Example of totally non-projective algebra.
Let us note the following simple but nevertheless helpful proposition.
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Proposition 5.6. Any quasivariety containing a totally non-projective al-
gebra is not primitive.
Corollary 5.7. A quasivariety generated by a cyclic Heyting algebra C2m+1
of cardinality 2m + 1 is not primitive for any m ≥ 5.
Proof. The proof immediately follows from the observation that for every
m ≥ 5 cyclic algebra C2m+5 contains a subalgebra (isomorphic to) C
′
7, which
is totally non-projective. 
Let Q be a quasivariety. Recall that Q is called locally finite if every
finitely-generated algebra from Q is finite.
We will use the following criterion of primitiveness of locally finite quasi-
varieties from [11, Proposition 5.1.24].
Proposition 5.8. A locally finite quasivariety Q is primitive if and only if
every finite subdirectly Q-irreducible algebra is weakly projective in Q.
Thus, due to Propositions 5.4 and 5.8, in order to prove that a deduc-
tive system is not hereditarily structurally complete, it is enough to show
that Q(S) contains a Q-irreducible algebra that is not weakly Q-projective,
provided that Q(S) is locally finite. In the following sections we use this
approach to establish that there are continuum many deductive system that
are not hereditarily structurally complete.
Quasivarieties generated by finite cyclic algebras. First, let us
consider the infinite cyclic Heyting algebra RN - the Rigier-Nishimura lad-
der. Let us observe that RN is a subalgebra of FH(ω). Since H, regarded
as quasivariety, corresponds to IPC and we know that ĨPC is HSCpl , we can
conclude that Q(FH(ω)) is a primitive quasivariety, hence, its subquasiva-
riety generated by RN is also primitive. In other words,
Proposition 5.9. The structural completion of the logic of RN is HSCpl.
Before we turn to the quasivarieties generated by finite cyclic algebras,
let us prove the following simple proposition which will be instrumental in
what follows.
Proposition 5.10. (comp.[24, Lemma 4.1.10]) Let A be an n-generated
algebra and V be a variety generated by A. Then,
Q(FV(ω)) = Q(FV(n)).
Proof. Due to FV(n) is a subalgebra of FV(ω), we haveQ(FV(n)) ⊆ Q(FV(ω)).
Also, due to every quasivariety contains free algebras, Q(FV(ω)) is the least
(relative ⊆) subquasivariety of V that generates V. Hence, we only need to
verify that FV(n) generates V. Since FV(n) ∈ V, all identities valid in V are
valid in FV(n), and we need to show that if an identity τ is refuted in V,
then τ is refuted in FV(n) too.
Indeed, suppose τ is an identity refuted in V. Then, due to A generates
V, this identity is refuted in A. Recall that A is n-generated and, hence, A
is a homomorphic image of FV(n). Hence, τ cannot be valid in FV(n). 
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Now, let us turn to the quasivarieties generated by finite cyclic algebras.
First, we recall that ifA is a finite algebra, then quasivariety Q(A) is locally
finite, and any non-trivial finite Q(A)-irreducible algebra is embedded in A
(see e.g. [11, Proposition 3.1.6]). Secondly, by Proposition 5.10, if A is
cyclic, that is, A is generated by a single element,
Q(FQ(A)(ω)) = Q(FQ(A)(1)).
Thus, if A is cyclic, in order to establish that Q(FQ(A)(ω)) is primitive
it is necessary and sufficient to verify that every Q(FQ(A)(1))-irreducible
subalgebra of FQ(A)(1) is weakly Q(FQ(A)(1))-projective.
Let Cn, n > 1 denotes a cyclic Heyting algebra having n elements. Then
the following holds.
theorem 5.11. Quasivariety Q(Cn) is primitive if and only if n = 2,3,4,5,
6,8,9,10,12,14.
Proof. The primitiveness of Q(Cn) for n = 2,3,4,5,6,8,9 follows immedi-
ately from the criterion from [9]. By Corollary 5.7, Q(C2k+1) for all k ≥ 5
are not primitive.
Let us prove that Q(C2k) for all k ≥ 8 are not primitive, and this will
leave us only with cases n = 10,12,14.
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
● ●
●
●
● ●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
● ●1
● ●2
● ●3
⋮ ⋮
● ●n
●
●
C′7 C
′
10 C
′
12 C16 An
Figure 2. Frames for proof of non-primitiveness.
Indeed, consider algebras C′7,C
′
10,C
′
12,C16 corresponding to frames de-
picted at Fig.2 and let Q16 ∶= Q(C16). Algebras C′10,C
′
12
are subalgebras of
C16 and, hence, C
′
10
,C′
12
∈ Q16. Algebra C′10 is Q16-irreducible, for algebra
C′
7
∉ Q16 and it is a subdirect factor of C′10. And, C
′
10
is a homomorphic
image of C′
12
, but it is not a subalgebra of C′
12
. Hence, C′
10
is not weakly
Q16-projective and quasivariety Q16 is not primitive.
The above proof holds for any algebra C2k for any k ≥ 8.
The cases n = 10,12,14 can be checked by listing all the Q-irreducible
subalgebras of respective algebras and verifying that all of them are weakly
Q-projective. 
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Corollary 5.12. If V is a variety such that cardinality of FV(1) is finite
and exceeds 13, then Q(FV(ω)) is not primitive.
Proof. Let V be a variety and FV(1) has n elements and n > 13. Then, by
Theorem 5.11, Q(FV(1)) is not primitive. So, Q(FV(ω)) is not primitive,
because Q(FV(1)) is a subquasivariety of Q(FV(ω)). 
In other words, the following holds.
Corollary 5.13. If L is a logic whose Lindenbaum algebra of formulas on
one variable is finite and has at least 14 elements, then structural completion
of L is not HSCpl. In particular, structural completions of deductive systems
⟨BDn,mp⟩ for all n > 3 are not HSCpl.
Proof. The proof follows from the known fact that for n > 3 cyclic Linden-
baum algebra of BDn is finite and has more then 14 elements. 
Now, we can prove the main theorem of this section.
theorem 5.14. There is continuum many superintuitionistic logic struc-
turally completion of which is not HSCpl.
Proof. We will use Corollaries 5.13 and 5.12 and construct continuum many
varieties free cyclic algebras of which contain more then 13 elements. We will
use the Jankov’s argument: let N2 be a set of all natural numbers greater
than 2 and let us consider algebras Am,m ∈ N2 corresponding to frames Am
depicted at Fig.2. Let I be an arbitrary set of N2, and let VI be a variety
generated by algebras Am,m ∈ I. Observe that C16 is a homomorphic
image of algebras Am, hence FVI(1) has at least 16 elements. On the other
hand, algebra C19 - the cyclic algebra with 19 elements - is not embedded
in either of algebras Am,m ∈ I or their homomorphic images. Hence, the
characteristic formula X(C19) (see [16]) of C19 is valid in each Am,m ∈ I
and, hence, X(C19) is valid in VI . Thus, C19 ∉ VI , and this means that
FVI(1) is finite, because C19 is a homomorphic image of RN, i.e. RN ∉ VI .
So, we have established that FVI(1) is finite and has at least 16 elements.
It is clear that there is continuum many subsets of N2 and all we need is to
prove that I uniquely defines VI , that is, we need to prove that if I1, I2 ⊆ N2
and I1 ≠ I2, then VI1 ≠ VI2 . But the latter follows from the properties of
characteristic formulas (see [16])) and the observation that if n ≠m, algebra
An is not embedded in any homomorphic image of Am. 
5.3. Absence of the Least HSCpl Deductive System. The goal of this
Section is to demonstrate that there is not the least hereditarily complete
deductive system extending IPC and, hence, the criterion similar to the one
from [9], is impossible.
theorem 5.15. There is no least HSCpl deductive system above IPC.
Proof. First, observe that ĨPC is a minimal (relative to ⪅) hereditarily struc-
turally deductive system extending IPC. Indeed, all systems between IPC
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and ĨPC have the same logic, namely Int. Thus, except for ĨPC, all these
systems are not even structurally complete. So, it is enough to present a
HSCpl deductive system S such that S that is not an extension of ĨPC.
Let L7 be a set of all formulas valid in C7 - cyclic Heyting algebra with 7
elements and ket S7 ∶= ⟨L7,mp⟩. We will prove that the following holds
(a) S̃7 is hereditarily structurally complete;
(b) ĨPC /⪅ S̃7.
Proof of (a). First, note that S̃7, as any structural completion, is trivially
structurally complete, and we only need to demonstrate that all its proper
extensions are structurally complete. But every proper extension of S̃7 has
a logic that is a proper extension of L7, and in [9] it had been proven that
all such logics are even hereditarily structurally complete.
Proof of (b). Recall from [7] that the following substitution instance of
Visser’s rule V1 (also known as generalized Mints’ rule) is admissible in IPC:
M ∶= r ∨ ((p1 → q)→ (p1 ∨ p2))/r ∨ ((p1 → q)→ p1) ∨ ((p1 → q)→ p2).
Therefore, M is derivable in ĨPC and all its extensions. At the same time,
this rule is not admissible in L7: take
p1 = ¬¬q, p2 = ¬q, and r = (¬¬q → q).
On one hand, we have
(¬¬q → q) ∨ ((¬¬q → q)→ (¬¬q ∨ ¬q)) ∈ L7.
On the other hand, we have
(¬¬q → q) ∨ ((¬¬q → q)→ ¬¬q) ∨ ((¬¬q → q)→ ¬q) ∉ L7,
because by the Glivenko Theorem, the above formula is equal in IPC to the
following formula
(¬¬q → q) ∨ ¬¬q ∨ ¬q,
and the latter formula is not valid in C7, that is, it is not a theorem of L7.
So, we have established that ruleM is derivable in ĨPC and is not derivable
in L̃7, which proves (b). 
5.4. Hereditary Structural Incompleteness of K̃P and M̃L. Recall
that KP denotes Kreisel-Putnam’s logic and ML denotes Medvedev’s logic.
In this Section we to prove that K̃P is not hereditarily structurally com-
plete (structural incompleteness of KP was observed in [28]). The author is
grateful to E. Jerˇa´bek who suggested the idea of the proof.
First, we recall that ML is structurally complete, due to [21], ML is struc-
turally complete, that is, every admissible in ML rule is derivable in it.
Hence,
M̃L ≈ML. (19)
18 ALEX CITKIN
In [17] Levin had constructed a class F○ of formulas5 that posses the
following property.
Proposition 5.16. (see [17, Theorem 4]) For any formula A,
⊢ML A if and only if ⊢KP σ(A) for every substitution σ ∶ P → F
○.
So, in a way, ML is reduced to KP. Let us consider how such reduction is
linked to admissibility.
Reducibility of Deductive Systems. Let S1 and S2 be deductive
systems and Σ be a set of substitutions. Then S1 is Σ-reducible to S2 if for
any formula A,
⊢S1 A if and only if for every σ ∈ Σ, ⊢S2 σ(A). (20)
Proposition 5.17. Let S1 and S2 be deductive systems, Σ be a set of sub-
stitutions, and S1 be Σ-reducible to S2. Then every admissible in S2 rule is
admissible in S1.
Proof. Suppose a rule r is admissible in S2. We need to prove that r is ad-
missible in S1. For this we prove the inverse statement: if r is not admissible
in S1, then r is not admissible in S2.
Suppose rule r ∶= A1, . . . ,An/B is not admissible in S1. Then there is a
substitution σ such that
⊢S1 σ(Ai) for all i = 1, . . . , n, while ⊬S1 σ(B).
Since ⊬S1 B, Σ-reducibility entails that there is a substitution σ
′ ∈ Σ such
that
⊬S2 σ
′(σ(B)). (21)
On the other hand, Σ-reducibility entails that for every i = 1, . . . , n
⊢S2 σ
′(σ(Ai)). (22)
And (22) and (21) mean that r is not admissible in S2. 
Corollary 5.18. If a deductive system S1 is Σ-reducible to S2, then S̃2 ⪅ S̃1.
Hence, if S̃2 is hereditarily structurally complete, so is S̃1.
The Case of ML. Using Levin’s Theorem and Corollary 5.18 we can
prove the following theorem.
theorem 5.19. Every admissible in KP rule is derivable in ML.
Proof. Indeed, (5.16) means that ML is Σ′-reducible to KP, where Σ′ ∶=
{σ ∈ Σ ∶ σ ∶ P → F○}. Hence, by Corollary 5.18,
K̃P ⪅ M̃L. (23)
Now, we can use (19) and obtain
K̃P ⪅ M̃L ≈ML. (24)
And (24) means that every admissible in KP rule is derivable in ML. 
5The definition of this class is irrelevant for our purposes, but the reader can find it in
[17].
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Recall also (see [9]), that ML is not hereditarily structurally complete.
Hence, by Corollary 5.18 and (24), we have
Corollary 5.20. K̃P is not hereditarily structurally complete.
5.5. Hereditary Structural Completeness and Finite Model Prop-
erty. In this Section we show that there is continuum many hereditarily
structurally complete deductive systems that cannot be defined by their fi-
nite models, which is different from the situation with deductive systems
with mp as a single inference rule.
A logic L is said to have the finite model property (fmp for short) if for
every formula A ∉ L there is a finite model of L in which A is refuted. A logic
L has the finite model property relative to admissibility (a-fmp for short), if
for every rule r not admissible in L there is a finite model of L in which all
admissible in L rules are valid and r is not valid, that is, there is a finite
model of ̃⟨L,mp⟩ that refutes r. In other words, S has the a-fmp if each rule
valid in every finite model of S̃ is admissible in S.
In [22] Rybakov described all superintutionistic logics enjoying a-fmp. In
[12, Section 3.6] Goudsmit presented some classes of superintuitionistic logics
that do not have the a-fmp. The normal modal logics with and without the
a-fmp are studied in [25, 26].
In this Section we establish connections between a-fmp and hereditary
structural completeness.
theorem 5.21. If a deductive system S admits V1 and enjoys the a-fmp,
then S̃ is hereditarily structural complete.
Proof. First, recall that the generalized Mints rule M is a substitution in-
stance of V1, hence, admissibility of V1 entails admissibility of M . Now,
we can apply [8, Corollary 2] and conclude that all admissible in Int rules,
and, therefore, all Visser’s rules are valid in every finite model of S̃. Since
S enjoys the a-fmp, all Visser’s rules are admissible in S̃, and this means
that S̃ is a deductive extension of ĨPC. By Theorem 5.1, ĨPC is hereditarily
structurally complete, so, S̃ is hereditarily structurally complete. 
Let us note that a-fmp is a property of structural completion of a deduc-
tive system S rather than property of S per se. This is to say that, any two
logically equivalent deductive systems either both have the a-fmp, or both
do not have the a-fmp. Hence, if a deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩ enjoys
the a-fmp, then deductive system ⟨L(S),mp⟩ enjoys the a-fmp. The Theo-
rem 7 of [22] (see also [24, Theorem 6.3.5]) states that there is continuum
many deductive extensions of ĨPC. On the other hand, there is only count-
able many hereditarily structural complete superintuitionistic logics (see e.g.
[24, Theorem 5.4.10]). Hence, the following holds.
Corollary 5.22. There is continuum many hereditarily structural complete
deductive systems without the a-fmp.
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5.6. Open Problems. In conclusion, let us point out some open problems.
We start with decidability of hereditary structural completeness that may
be presented in two different ways.
Problem 1. Is there an algorithm that, given a formula A, decides whether
the structural completion of ⟨Ax i +A,mp⟩ is hereditarily structural com-
plete?
Problem 2. Is there an algorithm that, given a finite Heyting algebra A,
decides whether the structural completion of logic of A (that is, the struc-
tural completion of ⟨L(A),mp⟩) is hereditarily structural complete?
Since structural completion of IPC is HSCpl , the following problem is
important.
Problem 3. Is there an algorithm that, given a formula A, decides whether
the logic ⟨Ax i +A,mp⟩ admits all admissible in IPC rules (i.e. admits all
Visser’s rules)?
Let us note that, due to Theorem 6.3.6 from [24], there is an algorithm
that, given a finite Heyting algebra A, decides whether logic L(A) admits
all Visser’s rules.
Problem 4. Is there an algorithm that, given a finite Heyting algebra A,
decides whether a deductive system defined by A is hereditarily structural
complete? In other words, is there an algorithm that, given a finite Heyting
algebra A, decides whether quasivariety Q(A) is primitive?
Let us observe that in spite of Proposition 5.10, the positive answer to
Problem 4 entails a positive answer to Problem 2.
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